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THE RISK OF  being “hacked”—whatever that expression ac-tually means—is at the heart of our civilization’s chronic cybersecurity problem. De-
spite decades of computer security 
research, billions spent on secure op-
erations, and growing training require-
ments, we seem incapable of operating 
computers securely.
There are weekly reports of pen-
etrations and data thefts at some of 
the world’s most sensitive, impor-
tant, and heavily guarded computer 
systems. There is good evidence that 
global interconnectedness combined 
with the proliferation of hacker tools 
means that today’s computer systems 
are actually less secure than equiva-
lent systems a decade ago. Numerous 
breakthroughs in cryptography, se-
cure coding, and formal methods not-
withstanding, cybersecurity is getting 
worse as we watch.
So why the downward spiral? One 
reason is that cybersecurity’s goal of re-
ducing successful hacks creates a large 
target to defend. Attackers have the 
luxury of choice. They can focus their 
efforts on the way our computers rep-
resent data, the applications that pro-
cess the data, the operating systems 
on which those applications run, the 
networks by which those applications 
communicate, or any other area that 
is possibly subverted. And faced with 
a system that is beyond one’s techni-
cal hacking skills, an attacker can go 
around the security perimeter and use 
a range of other techniques, including 
social engineering, supply-chain inser-
tion, or even kidnapping and extortion. 
It may be that cybersecurity appears 
to be getting worse simply because 
society as a whole is becoming much 
more dependent upon computers. 
Even if the vulnerability were not in-
creasing, the successful hacks can have 
significantly more reach today than a 
decade ago.
Views of Cybersecurity
The breadth of the domain means 
many different approaches are being 
proposed for solving the cybersecurity 
problem:
 ornm58 Cybersecurity can be viewed solely 
as an insider problem. What is needed, 
say advocates, are systems that prevent 
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Inside Risks  
The Cybersecurity Risk 
Increased attention to cybersecurity has  
not resulted in improved cybersecurity.
http://simson.net/clips/academic/2012.CACM.Cybersecurity.pdf
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I have spent 25 years trying to secure computers...
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An Introduction to 
Computer Security 
[Part 1] 
Simson L. Garfinkel 
"Spies," "vandals," and "crackers" are out there, 
waiting to get into-or destroy-your databases. 
L AWYERS MUST UNDERSTAND is-sues of computer security, both 
for the protection of their own inter-
ests and the interests of their clients. 
39 
Lawyers today must automatically 
recognize insecure computer systems 
and lax operating procedures in the 
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The lack of security is inherent in modern information systems.
• Attack is easier and cheaper than defense.
• Cyber “defense in depth” does not work
— a single vulnerability compromises.
It’s easier to break things than to fix them.
Today’s systems are less secure than those of the 1970s.
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Cyber can directly target  
inner defenses
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May 2013 — 
$45 million stolen from US banks with phony ATM cards
6
How hackers allegedly stole “unlimited”
amounts of cash from banks in just hours
Feds  accuse  eight  men  of  participating  in  heists  that  netted  $45  million.
Wikipedia
Federal  authorities  have  accused  eight  men  of  participating  in  21st-­Century  Bank  heists  that  netted  a
whopping  $45  million  by  hacking  into  payment  systems  and  eliminating  withdrawal  limits  placed  on
prepaid  debit  cards.
The  eight  men  formed  the  New  York-­based  cell  of  an  international  crime  ring  that  organized  and
executed  the  hacks  and  then  used  fraudulent  payment  cards  in  dozens  of  countries  to  withdraw  the
loot  from  automated  teller  machines,  federal  prosecutors  alleged  in  court  papers  unsealed  Thursday.
In  a  matter  of  hours  on  two  separate  occasions,  the  eight  defendants  and  their  confederates
withdrew  about  $2.8  million  from  New  York  City  ATMs  alone.  At  the  same  times,  "cashing  crews"  in
cities  in  at  least  26  countries  withdrew  more  than  $40  million  in  a  similar  fashion.
Prosecutors  have  labeled  this  type  of  heist  an  "unlimited  operation"  because  it  systematically
removes  the  withdrawal  limits  normally  placed  on  debit  card  accounts.  These  restrictions  work  as  a
safety  mechanism  that  caps  the  amount  of  loss  that  banks  normally  face  when  something  goes
wrong.  The  operation  removed  the  limits  by  hacking  into  two  companies  that  process  online
payments  for  prepaid  MasterCard  debit  card  accounts  issued  by  two  banks—the  National  Bank  of
Ras  Al-­Khaimah  PSC  in  the  United  Arab  Emirates  and  the  Bank  of  Muscat  in  Oman—according  to  an
indictment  filed  in  federal  court  in  the  Eastern  District  of  New  York.  Prosecutors  didn't  identify  the
payment  processors  except  to  say  one  was  in  India  and  the  other  in  the  United  States.
The  first  heist,  which  occurred  on  December  22  and  targeted  debit  cards  issued  by  the  UAE  bank,
dispatched  carders  in  about  20  countries  that  rapidly  withdrew  funds  in  more  than  4,500  ATM
transactions.  In  New  York  City  alone,  prosecutors  said,  the  defendants  and  their  co-­conspirators
withdrew  almost  $400,000  in  some  750  fraudulent  transactions  from  more  than  140  different  ATM
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April 2013 —
AP Twitter feed reports White House bombing
7
Hacked AP Twitter feed reporting fake
White House attack rocks markets
Account  compromise  comes  after  AP  targeted  by  malware  and  phishing  e-­mails.
The  seven-­minute  drop  in  the  Dow  Jones  Industrial  Average  touched  off  by  a  single  tweet  falsely  claiming  the  White
House  had  been  bombed.  It  temporarily  wiped  out  about  1  percent  of  the  average,  which  can  translate  into  millions  or
billions  of  dollars  in  market  capitalization.
Stock  prices  plunged  and  then  quickly  recovered  after  a  Twitter  account  belonging  to  the  Associated
Press  was  hacked  and  used  to  send  a  bogus  report  falsely  claiming  that  the  White  House  had  been
bombed  and  President  Obama  was  injured.
"The  @AP  Twitter  account  has  been  suspended  after  it  was  hacked,"  an  unaffected  Twitter  account
belonging  to  the  news  organization  confirmed.  "The  tweet  about  an  attack  on  the  White  House  was
false."
In  a  testament  to  the  power  that  social  media  has  on  real-­world  finances,  the  Dow  Jones  Industrial
Average  fell  150  points,  or  about  1  percent,  immediately  following  the  tweet,  with  other  indexes
reacting  similarly.  The  Dow  quickly  regained  the  lost  ground  about  seven  minutes  after  the  sell-­off
began,  when  the  AP  confirmed  that  the  report  was  false.
The  bogus  tweet  was  sent  from  one  of  at  least  of  two  compromised  Twitter  accounts  belonging  to  the
Associated  Press.  Mike  Baker,  a  reporter  with  the  167-­year-­old  news  organization,  said  the  AP's
mobile  Twitter  account  was  compromised  as  well.  "The  @AP  hack  came  less  than  an  hour  after
some  of  us  received  an  impressively  disguised  phishing  email,"  he  wrote  in  a  separate  Twitter
dispatch.  In  recent  days  security  personnel  with  the  news  cooperative  discovered  malware  had
infected  some  of  its  computers,  officials  told  the  New  York  Times.
An  AP  spokesman  said  officials  are  working  with  Twitter  to  investigate  how  the  accounts  were
hacked.  Both  accounts  were  suspended  at  the  time  of  this  writing.
People  claiming  ties  with  a  group  known  as  the  Syrian  Electronic  Army  took  credit  for  the  compromise
and  provided  this  screenshot,  purporting  to  show  user  control  over  the  @AP  account,  as  proof.  The
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March 2014:
IRS Employee Took Home Data on 20,000 Workers
8
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March 2014: Stolen F-35 secrets showing up in China’s 
stealth Fighter
9
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March 2014: Target ignored alarms before hack.
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The cyber security mess: it’s technical and social.
Most attention is focused on technical issues:
• Malware and anti-viruses
• Access controls, authentication & cryptography
• Supply chain issues
• Cyberspace as a globally connected “domain”
Non-technical issues are at the heart of the cyber security mess.
• Education & career paths
• Immigration
• Manufacturing policy
We will do better when we want to do better.
11
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What do we know 
about cyber security 
today?
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Cyber Security... is undefined.
There is no good definition for “cyber”




• Using “network security” to secure desktops & servers?
There is no way to measure the security of a “cyber” system
• Which OS is more secure?
• Which computer is more secure?
• Is “open source” more secure?
—A system that seems “more secure” 
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We can measure expenditures.
Cyber Security is expensive.
Global cyber security spending: $60 billion in 2011
• Cyber Security M&A, pwc, 2011
172 Fortune 500 companies surveyed:
• Spending $5.3 billion per year on cyber security.
• Stopping 69% of attacks.
If they raise spending...
• $10.2 billion stops 84%
• $46.67 billion stops 95%
• “highest attainable level”
95% is not good enough.
Spending more money does not make a computer more secure.
14
Cyber Security M&A
Decoding deals in the global 
Cyber Security industry
pwc.com
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Paradox:













The more we learn about securing computers, 
the better we get at attacking them
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Cyber Security is an “insider problem.”
bad actors
good people with bad instructions
remote access
malware
If we can stop insiders, we might be able to secure cyberspace….
—... but we can’t stop insiders.
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http://www.flickr.com/photos/shaneglobal/5115134303/
Ames Hanssen Manning Snowden
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Cyber Security is a “network security” problem.
We can’t secure the hosts, so secure the network!
• Isolated networks for critical functions.
• Stand-alone hosts for most important functions.
But strong crypto limits visibility into network traffic, and...
17
http://www.flickr.com/photos/dungkal/2315647839/
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... stuxnet shows that there are no isolated hosts.
18
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
inspects nuclear centrifuges 
Tuesday, March 25, 14
—Robert Morris (1932-2001), to the National Research Council’s Computer 
Science and Technology Board, Sept. 19, 1988
19
“to a first approximation, every computer in the world is 
connected to every other computer.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/technology/30morris.html
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“Computer Insecurity”, Peter G. Neumann
Issues In Science & Technology, Fall 1994
“Action is needed on many fronts to protect computer systems and 




The wonders of the Internet and the promise of the worldwide information infrastruc-
ture have recently reached headline status. Connectedness has become the Holy Grail
of the 1990s. But expansion of the electronic network brings with it increased potential
for harm as well as good. With a broader cross section of people logging on to the elec-
tronic superhighway and with the enhanced interconnectedness of all computer sys-
tems, the likelihood of mischievous or even criminal behavior grows, as does the poten-
tial extent of the damage that can be done.
But in spite of the higher risks and higher stakes, little attention has been paid to
the need for enhanced security. The stories that appear in the press from time to time
about prankster hackers breaking into a computer network or computer viruses
infecting government systems focus more on the skill of the culprit than the harm
done. The popular assumption is that break-ins are relatively harmless. Most
computer users complacently believe that if there was real cause for alarm,
government or corporate computer experts would recognize the problem and take
appropriate action.
Unfortunately, experts and neophytes alike have their heads in the sand on this
issue. In spite of repeated examples of the vulnerability of almost all computer
systems to invasion and manipulation, very few people recognize the magnitude of
the damage that can be done and even fewer have taken adequate steps to fix the
problem.
Action is needed on many
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Cyber Security is a “process” problem.
Security encompasses all aspects
of an organization’s IT and HR
operations.
Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle
—Few organizations can afford SDL.
—Windows 7 Windows 8 is still hackable...
21
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bruce_Schneier_1.jpg
“Security is a process, 
not a product”
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January 2013: Windows RT jailbroken
Microsoft controlled the 
hardware and the software.
Windows RT — still hacked
22
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Cyber Security is a money problem.
Security is a cost.....Not an “enabler”
• No ROI
Chief Security Officers are in a no-win situation:
• Security = passwords = frustration
• No reward for spending money to secure the infrastructure
• Money spent on security is “wasted” if there is no attack
—“If you have responsibility for security but have no authority to set rules or 
punish violators, your own role in the organization is to take the blame when 
something big goes wrong.”
• Spaf’s first principle of security administration
Practical Unix Security, 1991
23
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March 5, 2014:
Target’s Chief Information Officer resigned
24
Tuesday, March 25, 14
Cyber Security is a “wicked problem”
No clear definition of the wicked problem
—You don’t understand the problem until you have a solution.
No “stopping rule”
—The problem can never be solved.
Solutions not right or wrong
—Benefits to one player hurt another — Information security vs. Free speech
Solutions are “one-shot” — no learning by trial and error
—No two systems are the same. The game keeps changing.
Every wicked problem is a symptom of another problem
• Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” 1973
• Dave Clement, “Cyber Security as a Wicked Problem,” Chatham House, October 2011
• http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/archive/view/178579
25
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Is it the technology?
Why is cyber security so 
hard?
26
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Cyber Security has an active, malicious adversary.
The adversary...
—Turns your bugs into exploits
—Adapts to your defenses
—Waits until you make a mistake 
—Attacks your employees when your systems are secure
27
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For example...
Compiler bugs are security vulnerabilities!
Compilers are core technology 
used in software development.
We have seen:
• Optimizations to make programs 
run faster can become security 
vulnerabilities
• The same errors are repeatedly 
made by different programmers
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Bugs in CPU silicon are remotely exploitable!
This means:
• Programs that are “secure” on one CPU may be vulnerable on another.
• Auditing the code & the compiler isn’t enough.
Kaspersky:
• “Fact: malware that uses CPU bugs really does exist;”
• “not apocalypse, just a new threat;”
29
Remote Code Execution 
through Intel CPU Bugs
Kris Kaspersky, Alice Chang
Endeavor Security, Inc.
CPU bugs are like a bullet from behind
www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~sergey/cs258/2010/D2T1 - Kris Kaspersky - Remote Code Execution Through Intel CPU Bugs.pdf
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Smartphone designers were sure that there was no privacy leakage 
in accelerometers. We now know they can:
• Reveal your position
• Reveal your PIN
ACComplice: Location Inference using
Accelerometers on Smartphones
Jun Han, Emmanuel Owusu, Le T. Nguyen, Adrian Perrig, Joy Zhang
{junhan, eowusu, lenguyen, perrig, sky}@cmu.edu
Carnegie Mellon University
Abstract—The security and privacy risks posed by smartphone
sensors such as microphones and cameras have been well docu-
mented. However, the importance of accelerometers have been
largely ignored. We show that accelerometer readings can be
used to infer the trajectory and starting point of an individual
who is driving. This raises concerns for two main reasons.
First, unauthorized access to an individual’s location is a serious
invasion of privacy and security. Second, current smartphone
operating systems allow any application to observe accelerometer
readings without requiring special privileges. We demonstrate that
accelerometers can be used to locate a device owner to within a
200 meter radius of the true location. Our results are comparable
to the typical accuracy for handheld global positioning systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Location privacy has been a hot topic in recent news after it
was reported that Apple, Google, and Microsoft collect records
of the location of customers using their mobile operating sys-
tems [12]. In some cases, consumers are seeking compensation
in civil suits against the companies [8]. Xu and Teo find
that, in general, mobile phone users express lower levels of
concern about privacy if they control access to their personal
information. Additionally, users expect their smartphones to
provide such a level of control [20].
There are situations in which people may want to broadcast
their location. In fact, many social networking applications in-
corporate location-sharing services, such as geo-tagging photos
and status updates, or checking in to a location with friends.
However, in these instances, users can control when their
location is shared and with whom. Furthermore, users express
a need for an even richer set of location-privacy settings than
those offered by current location-sharing applications [2]. User
concerns over location-privacy are warranted. Websites like
“Please Rob Me” underscore the potential dangers of exposing
one’s location to malicious parties [5]. The study presented here
demonstrates a clear violation of user control over sensitive
private information.
This research was supported by CyLab at Carnegie Mellon under grants
DAAD19-02-1-0389 and W911NF-09-1-0273, from the Army Research Office,
and by support from NSF under TRUST STC CCF-0424422, IGERT DGE-
0903659, and CNS-1050224, and by a Google research award. The views
and conclusions contained here are those of the authors and should not be
interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements,
either express or implied, of ARO, CMU, Google, NSF or the U.S. Government
or any of its agencies.
Accelerometers are a particularly interesting case because of
their pervasiveness in a large assortment of personal electronic
devices including tablet PCs, MP3 players, and handheld gam-
ing devices. This array of devices provides a large network for
spyware to exploit.
Furthermore, by correlating the accelerometer readings be-
tween multiple phones it is possible for an adversary to de-
termine whether the phones are in close proximity. Because
phones undergoing similar motions can be identified by their
accelerations, events such as earthquakes or even everyday
activities like public transportation (e.g., bus, train, subway)
produce identifiable motion signatures that can be correlated
with other users. As a consequence, if one person grants GPS
access, or exposes their cellular or Wi-Fi base station, then they
essentially expose the location of all nearby phones, assuming
the adversary has access to these devices.
a) Contributions: Our key insight is that accelerometers
enable the identification of one’s location despite a highly
noisy trajectory output. This is because the idiosyncrasies of
roadways create globally unique constraints. Dead reckoning
can be used to track a user’s location long after location services
have been disabled [6]. But as we show, the accelerometer can
be used to infer a location with no initial location information.
This is a very powerful side-channel that can be exploited even
if location-based services on the device are disabled.
b) Threat Model: We assume that the adversary can
execute applications on the mobile device, without any special
privileges except the capability to send information over the
network. The application will use some legitimate reason to
obtain access to network communication. This is easily accom-
plished by mimicking a popular application that many users
download; e.g., a video game. In the case of a game, network
access would be needed to upload high scores or to download
advertisements. We assume that the OS is not compromised,
so that the malicious application simply executes as a standard
application. The application can communicate with an external
server to leak acceleration information. Based on the leaked
information, the adversary can extract a mobile user’s trajectory
from the compromised device via data analysis.
Our goal is to determine the location of an individual driving
in a vehicle based solely on motion sensor measurements. The
general approach that we take is to first derive an approximate
motion trajectory given acceleration measurements–which we
discuss in §II. We then correlate that trajectory with map978-1-4673-0298-2/12/$31.00 c⃝ 2012 IEEE
The attacker is smarter than you are…














(b) Mountain View, CA
Fig. 7. Verification of map matching algorithm with the known starting point. (a) and (b) show Experiment 2a (Pittsburgh, PA) and Experiment 2b (Mountain
View, CA), respectively. The green (star) curve indicates the motion trajectory obtained from ProbIN. The red (circle) curve indicates the mapped points. The
blue (x-mark) curve indicates the ground truth (i.e., actual route traveled) obtained from GPS data.
to the mapped point on C3, which is depicted in Figure 6(b).
This realignment mitigates the effect of the noise inherent in
the motion trajectory.
To verify the results, we perform the aforementioned map
matching algorithm on a map with a known starting point. We
pre-processed motion paths to remove highly transient noise in
the motion trajectory, which smooths the data while preserving
key features of the trajectory. Figure 7 illustrates the map
matching process of a motion trajectory.
Figures 7(a) and (b) show matching procedures for Experi-
ment 2a and Experiment 2b, respectively. The green (star) curve
shows the motion trajectory obtained from ProbIN. The red
(circle) curve illustrates the corresponding mapped points on
a map. The blue (x-mark) curve shows the ground truth using
GPS data to validate our algorithm.
B. Starting Point Prediction
This section explains an algorithm that can be used to predict
a starting point of a trajectory by applying the map matching
algorithm to all points on a given map. First the trajectory
is aligned to every point on the map (each node represents
a possible starting point). In order to determine the most likely
starting point, we compare each mapped route using a trajectory
difference metric (explained below).
We take the first point of the trajectory, P0, and plot all
candidate starting pionts. Let Mi be a point on a road network
that has been matched to Pi, a point on the motion trajectory.
We define Dist(Mi,Pi) as the distance between Mi and Pi.
Summing up Dist(Mi,Pi) from 1 to s, where s is the number







Figure 8 shows Dist(Mi,Pi) for all corresponding points
between the motion trajectory and the mapped points. The
difference score DS in Figure 8(a) is the sum of lengths of
Dist(Mi,Pi) for all i. Once DS is computed for each starting
point on the map, the starting points are ranked in ascending
order because a small DS is a good indicator that the actual
and predicted paths are similar.
In the case of erroneous starting points, the map matching
algorithm can encounter a dead end or may not be able to match
any road on the map to the motion trajectory, in which case the
map matching algorithm simply maps several motion trajectory
points to a single map location. Many starting points will not
result in any valid candidate paths, especially for longer paths
– we detect these cases and reject those paths.
We then take the top ten ranked points sorted in ascending
order of DS to locate the actual starting point. Among the highly
ranked points, the points are likely to form a few clusters of
nodes that have closely matched routes with the aligned motion
trajectory. If only a few clusters on a map are found, it is an
indication with strong certainty that the actual starting point is
in one of the clusters.
However, the motion trajectory is a noisy estimate of an
actual traveled route. Because the map matching algorithm is
topologically sensitive, some trajectories may not be accurately
scaled. In order to account for this fact, we stretch the motion
trajectory and repeat the prediction algorithm. With varied
trajectory scales, the probability of finding a valid match
between motion trajectory and the actual traveled route greatly
increases. The following section provides evaluation data.
https://sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/group/pub/han_ACComplice_comsnets12.pdf
Jun Han, Emmanuel Owusu, Thanh-Le Nguyen, Adrian Perrig, and Joy Zhang 
"ACComplice: Location Inference using Accelerometers on Smartphones" In Proceedings 
of the 4th International Conference on Communication Systems and Networks 
(COMSNETS 2012), Bangalore, India, January 3-7, 2012.
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Many people liken cyber security to the flu.
DHS calls for “cyber hygiene”
• install anti-virus
• update your OS
• back up key files
—“STOP, THINK, CONNECT”
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Another model might be obesity....
Making people fat is good business:
• Farm subsidies
• Restaurants
• Healthcare and medical utilization
• Weight loss plans
—Few make money when Americans stay 
trim and healthy.
Lax security is also good business:
• Cheaper cost of deploying software
• Private information for marketing
• Selling anti-virus & security products
• Cleaning up incidents
—Few benefit from secure computers
33
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Some people say that cyber war is like nuclear war.
34
http://www.beyondnuclear.org/security/http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/mind-cyber-gap-deterrence-cyberspace
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Security problems are bad for society as a whole...




Commercial Software radio Software radio Primary
programmer eavesdropper programmer risk
Determine whether patient has an ICD 4 4 4 Privacy
Determine what kind of ICD patient has 4 4 4 Privacy
Determine ID (serial #) of ICD 4 4 4 Privacy
Obtain private telemetry data from ICD 4 4 4 Privacy
Obtain private information about patient history 4 4 4 Privacy
Determine identity (name, etc.) of patient 4 4 4 Privacy
Change device settings 4 4 Integrity
Change or disable therapies 4 4 Integrity
Deliver command shock 4 4 Integrity
TABLE I
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENTAL ATTACKS. A CHECK MARK INDICATES A SUCCESSFUL IN VITRO ATTACK.
goal of understanding and addressing the potential security
risks of ICDs before future ICDs and other IMDs become
more complex and the potential security and privacy risks to
patients increase. However, we also firmly believe in disclosing
this information in an ethical manner that fully considers the
well-being of patients. We specifically and purposefully omit
details that would allow someone to use this article as a guide
for creating attacks against ICDs.
Paper organization. Section II gives a brief introduction
to ICDs, describes the security model we consider in this
work, and summarizes related work. Section III discusses
the process of intercepting and reverse-engineering an ICD’s
wireless communications, beginning with RF signal analysis
and culminating in readable plaintext. Section IV discusses
replay attacks that compromise device integrity by changing
stored information or therapy settings. Section V extends the
discussion of zero-power defenses into the realm of device
design. Finally, Section VI offers concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND, MODEL, AND RELATED WORK
This section summarizes the characteristics and medical
usage of a modern implantable cardioverter defibrillator. It also
introduces some of the equipment we used in our analyses.
Following this introduction, we construct a security model that
classifies potential adversaries in terms of their capabilities.
Finally, we summarize previous research that motivates and
informs the methods and results of this work.
A. Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs)
An implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) is a device
that monitors and responds to heart activity. ICDs have modes
for pacing, wherein the device periodically sends a small
electrical stimulus to the heart, and for defibrillation, wherein
the device sends a larger shock to restore normal heart rhythm.
A physician surgically implants the ICD below the patient’s
clavicle and close to the skin (Fig. 1). The physician also
implants electrical leads that connect the ICD to the heart
muscle. Post-surgery, a health care practitioner can use an
external programmer to perform diagnostics, read and write
private data, and adjust therapy settings. A malfunctioning or
maliciously configured ICD could harm a patient in multiple
Fig. 1. Chest xray image of an implanted ICD (top right, near shoulder,
solid outline) and electrical leads connected to heart chambers (center of rib
cage, dotted outline).
ways, including by inaction (failure to deliver treatment when
necessary) or by extraneous action such as a command shock
when the heart is beating normally.
Magnetic switch. Inside the ICD is a magnetic switch.
A magnetic field in proximity to this switch causes it to
close, which in turn causes the ICD to wirelessly transmit
telemetry data, including electrocardiogram (EKG) readings.
(We discovered, however, that we can activate transmission of
telemetry on our ICD solely with an RF command and without
the presence of a magnet; see Section IV.) In a clinical setting,
the magnetic field comes from a magnet in the programming
head, which is the component of the programmer that is placed
in proximity to a patient’s implanted ICD. At the surface of
one programming head we measured this magnet at 700 gauss.
Wireless communications. Our ICD wirelessly communicates
with the external programmer using the 175 kHz band, which
is intended for short-range communications. Newer ICDs
can communicate at both the 175 kHz frequency and in
This paper, copyright the IEEE, will appear in the proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 3
2008: demonstrated wireless
attack o  impla tabl  p cemakers
2012: demonstrated irel ss
atta k on insulin pump
http://www.autosec.org/
—Comprehensive Experimental Analysis of 
Automotive Attack Surfaces (2011)
—Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern 
Automobile (2010)
Remote take-over of EVERY safety-critic l system from 
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[ISN] TV-based botnets? DoS attacks on your fridge? 
More plausible than you think
!From: !InfoSec News <alerts@infosecnews.org>
!Subject: ! [ISN] TV-based botnets? DoS attacks on your fridge? More plausible than you 
think







It's still premature to say you need firewall or antivirus protection for your television set, but a 
duo of recently diagnosed firmware vulnerabilities in widely used TV models made by two 
leading manufacturers suggests the notion isn't as far-fetched as many may think.
... While poking around a Samsung D6000 model belonging to his brother, he inadvertently 
discovered a way to remotely send the TV into an endless restart mode that persists even 
after unplugging the device and turning it back on.
"It wasn't even planned," Auriemma told Ars, referring to the most damaging of his two 
attacks, which rendered the device useless for three days...
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[ISN] ATM Attacks Exploit Lax Security
!From: !InfoSec News <alerts@infosecnews.org>
!Subject: ! [ISN] ATM Attacks Exploit Lax Security
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Cell phones cannot be secured.
Cell phones have:
• Wireless networks, microphone, camera, & batteries
• Downloaded apps
• Bad crypto
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How do we address the cybersecurity challenge?
1. Deploy technology that works.
2. Address the non-technical issues.
40
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We have made major advances in cyber security.
Major security breakthroughs since 1980:
• Public key cryptography (RSA with certificates to distribute public keys)
• Fast symmetric cryptography (AES)
• Fast public key cryptography (elliptic curves)
• Easy-to-use cryptography (SSL/TLS)




None of these breakthroughs has been a “silver bullet,” but they 
have all helped.
—“Why Cryptosystems Fail,” Ross Anderson, 
1st Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 1993. 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/wcf.pdf
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We must continue to deploy technology that works, 
because adversaries are not all powerful.




You don’t have to run faster than the bear….
42http://forums.corvetteforum.com/off-topic/2824193-i-only-have-to-outrun-you-polar-bear-tag.html
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There are solutions to many cyber security problems...
We should use them!
30% of the computers on the Internet run Windows XP
• Windows 7 & 8 have vulnerabilities, but they’re better.
Apple users don’t use anti-virus.
• Yes, Apple tries to fix bugs, but 
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Example: Google Authenticator’s 2-factor authentication 
protections against password stealing.
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Example: 
Apply “Recovery Oriented Computing” to security.
Recovery Oriented Computing [Stanford & Berkeley]:
• Systems that are isolated and redundant
• System-wide undo support
• Integrated Diagnostic support
• Online verification and recovery mechanisms
• Modularity, measurability and restorability
Applying to security:
• Pervasive use of digital signatures.
• Disconnected, offline storage.
45
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We must address the non-technical factors that impact 
cyber security.
These factors reflect deep divisions within our society.
• Shortened development cycles
• Education: Not enough CS graduates; not enough security in CS.
• Labor:
—Immigration Policy: Foreign students; H1B Visa
—HR: Inability to attract and retain the best workers
• Manufacturing Policy: Where we are building our computers.
Solving the cyber security mess requires addressing these issues.
46
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Short development cycles
Insufficient planning:
• Security not “baked in” to most products.
• Few or no security reviews
• Little Usable Security
Insufficient testing:
• Testing does not uncover security flaws
• No time to retest after fixing
Poor deployment:
• Little monitoring for security problems
• Difficult to fix current system when new 
system is under development
47
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Education is not supplying enough security engineers.
Software engineers don’t learn enough about security.
Security HR Pipeline
• High School → College → Graduate School → Career
It takes years to master security...
• Many professional programmers learn their craft in college.
• College English graduates: 16 years’ instruction in writing
• College CS graduates: 4 years’ instruction in programming
—Is it any wonder their code has security vulnerabilities?
• 64% of the 2,500 vulnerabilities in the National Vulnerability Database in 
2004 were caused by programming errors.
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Snapchats Don't Disappear:
Forensics Firm Has Pulled
Dozens of Supposedly-Deleted
Photos From Android Phones
Another  way  to  undermine
Snapchat's  privacy  promises
A 24-year-old forensics examiner from Utah has
made a discovery that may make some Snapchat
users think twice before sending a photo that they
think is going to quickly disappear. Richard
Hickman of Decipher Forensics found that it’s
possible to pull Snapchat photos from Android
phones simply by downloading data from the
phone using forensics software and removing a
“.NoMedia” file extension that was keeping the
photos from being viewed on the device. He
published his findings online and local TV station
KSL has a video showing how it’s done.
“I was surprised no one else had done it because
of how easy it was,” said Hickman by phone. “It
just took a couple of days to discover it.”
Hickman started the research while in a Mobile
Forensics Class this spring. He says it’s come in
useful at Decipher Forensics as clients have wanted
Snapchat evidence from phones in divorce and
missing teenager cases. He says they have grabbed
60 to 70 deleted Snapchats from phones so far, with
at least 40 photos taken from just one phone.
Hickman says he’s now doing research on Snapchat
recovery from the iPhone; a few months ago,
Buzzfeed found at least one flaw that made that
possible. At the time, Snapchat founder Evan
Spiegel told Buzzfeed, “The people who most enjoy
using Snapchat are those who embrace the spirit and
intent of the service. There will always be ways to
reverse engineer technology products — but that
spoils the fun!”








I'm a privacy pragmatist, writing about the
intersection of law, technology, social media and
our personal information. If you have story ideas or
tips, e-mail me at khill@forbes.com. These days, I'm
a senior online editor at Forbes. I was previously an
editor at Above the Law, a legal blog, relying on the
legal knowledge gained from two years working for
corporate law firm Covington & Burling -- a Cliff's
Notes version of law school. In the past, I've been
K ASHMIR HIL L ’S POPUL AR POSTS
How Target Figured Out A Teen Girl Was Pregnant
Before Her Father Did 2,000,448  views
Oops. Mark Zuckerberg's Sister Has A Private
Facebook Photo Go Public. 965,936  views
Beware, Tech Abandoners. People Without
Facebook Accounts Are 'Suspicious.' 522,865  views
10 Incredibly Simple Things You Should Be Doing
To Protect Your Privacy 310,011  views
Another TSA Officer Leaves Personalized Note In
Passenger's Bag (After Finding Marijuana)
Follow  (1,349)
Kashmir  Hill,  Forbes  Staff











New  App  Lets  You  Boycott  Koch              
Brothers,  Monsanto  And  More  By           
Scanning  Your  Shopping  Cart        
+184,177  views
Lessons  From  Amy's  Baking  Company:           
Six  Things  You  Should  Never  Do  On                 
Social  Media   +103,273  views
Google  Continues  To  Play  Catch-­Up            -­
With  'All  Access'  Music  Service  As              
Critics  Sound  Off      +55,367  views
Samsung's  Galaxy  S4  Closes  In  On              
Apple's  iPhone  5      +51,152  views
Google  Now  Recovers  Apple's  Siri           
Fumble +38,005  views
  
30  comments,  11  called-­out Comment  Now Follow  Comments
New  Posts  






Iron Man vs. The Avengers
Search
Samsung's Galaxy S4 Closes In On
Apple's iPhone 5
+51,252  views  in  last  24  hours
 
Get  two  issues  of  Forbes  for  FREE! Help|Connect|Sign  up|Log  in
ost Read on Forbes
TECH   |   5/09/2013  @  4:51PM   | 261,967  views
Snapchats Don't Di appear:
Forensics Firm Has Pulled
Dozens of Su p sedly-Deleted
Photos From Android Phones
Another  way  to  undermine
Snapchat's  privacy  promises
A 24-year-old forensics examiner from Utah has
made a discovery that may make some Snapchat
users think twice before sending a photo that they
think is going to quickly disappear. Richard
Hickman of Decipher Forensics found that it’s
possible to pull Snapchat photos from Android
phones simply by downloading data from the
phone using forensics software and removing a
“.NoMedia” file extension that was keeping the
photos from being viewed on the device. He
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KSL has a video showing how it’s done.
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73% of states require computer “skills” for graduation.
Only 37% require CS “concepts”
CS teachers are paid far less than CS engineers.
—Salaries for beginning & average teachers lag CS engineers by 30%
—Adjusting for cost-of-living and shorter work week.
• Linda Darling-Hammond, Stanford University, 2004
http://www.srnleads.org/data/pdfs/ldh_achievemen_gap_summit/inequality_TCR.pdf
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Computer Science undergraduate enrollment has gone up 
for 4 years, but still not reached 2001-2004 levels
CRA is psyched at double-digit gains in recent years, but…
51
http://cra.org/govaffairs/blog/2013/03/taulbeereport/
2013 CRA Taulbee Survey
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—Most do not go on to advanced degrees.
7% of Bachelor’s degrees awarded to “nonresident alien”
(12,596 to US citizens)
52
Computing ReseaRCh news, may 2013
Vol. 25 / No. 5
http://cra.org/resources/crn-online/  24 
7DEOH%%DFKHORU·V'HJUHHV$ZDUGHGE\(WKQLFLW\
CS CE I Total
Nonresident Alien 619 6.8% 216 10.5% 98 4.1% 933 6.9%
Amer Indian or Alaska Native 39 0.4% 6 0.3% 12 0.5% 57 0.4%
Asian 1,477 16.3% 447 21.7% 341 14.2% 2,265 16.7%
Black or African-American 407 4.5% 107 5.2% 203 8.4% 717 5.3%
Native Hawaiian/Pac Islander 18 0.2% 4 0.2% 3 0.1% 25 0.2%
White 5,793 64.0% 1,154 55.9% 1,522 63.2% 8,469 62.6%
Multiracial, not Hispanic 130 1.4% 27 1.3% 26 1.1% 183 1.4%
Hispanic, any race 575 6.3% 102 4.9% 203 8.4% 880 6.5%
Total Residency &  Ethnicity Known 9,058 2,063 2,408 13,529
Resident, ethnicity unknown 732 117 89 938
Residency unknown 1,259 176 73 1,508
Grand Total 11,049 2,356 2,570 15,975
7DEOH%%DFKHORU·V'HJUHHV$ZDUGHGE\'HSDUWPHQW7\SH
Department Type # Depts CS CE I Total
US CS Public 105 7,619 69.0% 1,578 67.0% 1,004 39.1% 10,201 63.9%
US CS Private 37 2,248 20.3% 268 11.4% 338 13.2% 2,854 17.9%
Total US CS 142 9,867 89.3% 1,846 78.4% 1,342 52.2% 13,055 81.7%
US CE 9 0 0.0% 406 17.2% 0 0.0% 406 2.5%
US Info 9 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1,190 46.3% 1,190 7.4%
Canadian 14 1,182 10.7% 104 4.4% 38 1.5% 1,324 8.3%
Grand Total 174 11,049 2,356 2,570 15,975
7DEOH%%DFKHORU·V'HJUHHV$ZDUGHGE\*HQGHU
CS CE I Total
Male 9,349 87.1% 2,106 89.4% 2,129 82.8% 13,584 86.7%
Female 1,387 12.9% 250 10.6% 441 17.2% 2,078 13.3%
Total Known Gender 10,736 2,356 2,570 15,662
Gender Unknown 313 0 0 313
Grand Total 11,049 2,356 2,570 15,975
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—We should let them stay in the country after they graduate
54% of Master’s degrees awarded to nonresident alien
(4960 to US citizens)
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Computing ReseaRCh news, may 2013
Vol. 25 / No. 5
http://cra.org/resources/crn-online/  21 
7DEOH00DVWHU·V'HJUHHV$ZDUGHGE\(WKQLFLW\
CS CE I Total
Nonresident Alien 4,123 62.3% 544 69.3% 397 19.8% 5,064 53.8%
Amer Indian or Alaska Native 10 0.2% 1 0.1% 9 0.4% 20 0.2%
Asian 484 7.3% 52 6.6% 213 10.6% 749 8.0%
Black or African-American 123 1.9% 8 1.0% 122 6.1% 253 2.7%
Native Hawaiian/Pac Island 9 0.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 9 0.1%
White 1,725 26.1% 161 20.5% 1,144 57.0% 3,030 32.2%
Multiracial, not Hispanic 22 0.3% 1 0.1% 25 1.2% 48 0.5%
Hispanic, any race 123 1.9% 18 2.3% 96 4.8% 237 2.5%
Total Residency & Ethnicity Known 6,619 785 2,006 9,410
Resident, ethnicity unknown 285 78 144 507
Residency unknown 558 15 28 601
Grand Total 7,462 878 2,178 10,518
7DEOH00DVWHU·V'HJUHHV([SHFWHG1H[W<HDUE\'HSDUWPHQW7\SH
Department Type # Depts CS CE I Total
US CS Public 107 3,493 52.2% 379 46.3% 500 25.3% 4,372 46.1%
US CS Private 41 2,755 41.2% 141 17.2% 326 16.5% 3,222 34.0%
Total US CS 148 6,248 93.4% 520 63.5% 826 41.7% 7,594 80.0%
US CE 9 0 0.0% 294 35.9% 0 0.0% 294 3.1%
US Info 12 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1153 58.3% 1,153 12.1%
Canadian 14 444 6.6% 5 0.6% 0 0.0% 449 4.7%























US CS Public 3,436 104 33.0 356 18 19.8 400 13 30.8 4,192 106 39.5 2,600 62.0%
US CS Private 2,500 40 62.5 75 6 12.5 244 4 61.0 2,819 40 70.5 1,767 62.7%
Total US CS 5,936 144 41.2 431 24 18.0 644 17 37.9 7,011 146 48.0 4,367 62.3%
US CE 0 0 309 9 34.3 69 1 378 9 42.0 226 59.8%
US Info 0 0 0 0 1,145 12 95.4 1,145 12 95.4 339 29.6%
Canadian 527 14 37.6 34 2 17.0 0 0 561 14 40.1 320 57.0%
Grand Total 6,463 158 40.9 774 35 22.1 1,858 30 61.9 9,095 223 40.8 5,252 57.7%
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50% of PhDs awarded in 2012 to nonresident aliens
—We did not train Russia’s weapons scientists at MIT during the Cold War.
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Computing ReseaRCh news, may 2013
Vol. 25 / No. 5
http://cra.org/resources/crn-online/  13 
Table D2. PhDs Awarded by Gender
CS CE I Total
Male 1,275 82.2% 163 86.7% 70 55.1% 1,508 80.8%
Female 276 17.8% 25 13.3% 57 44.9% 358 19.2%
Total Known Gender 1,551 188 127 1,866
Gender Unknown 55 6 2 63
Grand Total 1,606 194 129 1,929
Table D3. PhDs Awarded by Ethnicity
CS CE I Total
Nonresident Alien 763 51.3% 99 55.3% 32 26.9% 894 50.1%
Amer Indian or Alaska Native 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 1 0.8% 2 0.1%
Asian 168 11.3% 32 17.9% 27 22.7% 227 12.7%
Black or African-American 27 1.8% 1 0.6% 7 5.9% 35 2.0%
Native Hawaiian/Pac Islander 5 0.3% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 5 0.3%
White 496 33.4% 45 25.1% 51 42.9% 592 33.2%
Multiracial, not Hispanic 5 0.3% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 5 0.3%
Hispanic, any race 22 1.5% 2 1.1% 1 0.8% 25 1.4%
Total Residency & Ethnicity Known 1,487 179 119 1,785
Resident, ethnicity unknown 25 1 5 31
Residency unknown 94 14 5 113
Grand Total 1,606 194 129 1,929
the number of total doctoral degrees 
increased 5.2 percent, and the 
number of doctoral degrees in U.S. CS 
programs rose 6.8 percent. (See Table 
1 on p. 23). The 1,929 doctoral degrees 
is the highest number ever reported 
in the Taulbee Survey, surpassing the 
previous high of 1,877 in 2008. The CS 
Ph.D. count of 1,606 also is the highest 
ever reported, besting the 2007 count 
of 1,599.
The fraction of the 2011-12 computer 
science graduates who were women 
(Table D2) declined slightly, to 17.8 
percent from 18.4 percent in 2010-11 
and 18.8 percent in 2009-10).  Also, a 
smaller fraction of CE graduates were 
women (13.3 percent vs. 22.1 percent in 
2010-11), but a much larger fraction of 
I graduates were women (44.9 percent 
vs. 32.5 percent in 2010-11).  The 
DQQXDO&(DQG,GHSDUWPHQWÁXFWXDWLRQV
are larger due to the comparatively small 
number of departments reporting in 
these categories.  Once again, a smaller 
IUDFWLRQRIWKLVSDVW\HDU·VJUDGXDWHV
were White (33.2 percent vs. 34.3 
percent in 2010-11 and 36.7 percent 
in 2009-10).  The fraction of graduates 
who are non-resident Aliens increased 
VOLJKWO\RYHUDOOEXWPRUHVLJQLÀFDQWO\
within CS programs (from 48.1 percent 
to 51.3 percent in the latter category).4
The number of new students per 
GHSDUWPHQWSDVVLQJTXDOLÀHUH[DPVLQ
U.S. CS departments is similar to that 
reported last year, while the number 
who passed thesis candidacy exams 
(most, but not all, departments have 
such exams) increased.  This suggests 
that the number of doctoral degrees 
produced will continue to increase in 
the near term.  In fact, next year the 
departments predict an increase of 
more than 11 percent in doctoral degree 
production, though they consistently 
have over-predicted the number of Ph.D. 
graduates in past estimates.  
The overall number of new Ph.D. 
students (Table D5) increased compared 
with last year (3,064 this year vs. 
2,812 last year).  However, on a per 
department basis, this total is similar to 
that of last year.  The number of new 
students per department in CE and 
Canadian programs also increased 
FRPSDUHGZLWKODVW\HDU·VÀJXUHV
while the number of new students per 
department in I programs decreased.  
These comparisons are much more 
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Just 67 / 1275 (5%) PhDs went into Information Assurance
15 professors & postdocs; 48 to industry & government
Security should be taught to everyone, but we need specialists
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North American PhD Granting Depts. 
Tenure-track 14 1 5 6 2 10 1 2 5 9 2 6 2 3 3 1 4 7 6 13 102 7.1% 
Researcher 6 1 4 6 1 1 0 6 2 0 2 7 2 2 2 3 1 3 7 17 73 5.1% 
Postdoc 38 1 12 17 4 12 0 20 7 5 2 12 7 7 14 6 3 10 30 34 241 16.8% 
Teaching Faculty 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 3 4 4 4 28 2.0% 
North American, 
Other Academic                       
Other CS/CE/I 
Dept. 3" 0" 4" 1" 1" 1" 4" 2" 2" 0" 5" 6" 1" 0" 0" 0" 0" 3" 1" 18" 52" 3.6%"




                      
Industry 64" 2" 49" 46" 41" 24" 20" 17" 40" 5" 6" 67" 29" 22" 25" 6" 12" 86" 32" 83" 676" 47.2%"
Government 7" 0" 5" 2" 6" 2" 5" 3" 8" 1" 2" 1" 0" 0" 2" 4" 1" 4" 2" 5" 60" 4.2%"
Self-Employed 0" 0" 0" 1" 0" 1" 0" 1" 0" 0" 2" 2" 2" 0" 1" 0" 0" 1" 1" 1" 13" 0.9%"
Unemployed 2" 0" 2" 1" 2" 2" 1" 0" 2" 0" 1" 3" 0" 0" 1" 0" 2" 0" 1" 3" 23" 1.6%"
Other 2" 0" 1" 0" 0" 0" 1" 1" 0" 0" 0" 1" 0" 0" 0" 0" 0" 0" 1" 0" 7" 0.5%"
Total Inside North 
America                       
 138" 6" 83" 80" 57" 54" 32" 53" 67" 22" 23" 106" 44" 35" 48" 20" 26" 118" 85" 178" 1,275" 89.0%"
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“...the problem may not be that 
there are too few STEM 
qualified college graduates, but 
rather that STEM firms are 
unable to attract them.
Highly qualified students may 
be choosing a non-STEM job 
because it pays better, offers a 
more stable professional 
career, and/or perceived as 
less exposed to competition 
from low-wage economies.”
Georgetown Prof: 50% of graduate students in sciences 
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Highest paying occupations:
• Oral Surgeons > $166,400
• Orthodontists > $166,400




• Architectural & Eng. Mgrs. $119,260
• Prosthodontists $118,400
• Podiatrists $118,030
• Natural Sci. Mgrs. $116,020
• Computer Scientists: $115,070
• Petroleum Engineers $114,080
• Marketing Managers $112,800
• Lawyers: $112,760
Bureau of Labor Statistics puts CS as 12th highest paying 
profession, after...
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Manufacturing policy —
The US did not buy WW2 aircraft from Germany
58
Boeing Whichata B-29 Assembly Line, 1944
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Boeing-Whichata_B-29_Assembly_Line_-_1944.jpg
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But we buy nearly all of our computers from China.
It’s easy to put backdoors in hardware and software.
59
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There is no obvious way to secure cyberspace.
We trust computers…
—but we cannot make them trustworthy. 
(A “trusted” system is a computer that can violate your security policy.)
We know a lot about building secure computers... 
—but we do not use this information when building and deploying them.
We know about usable security…
—but we can’t make any progress on usernames and passwords
We should design with the assumption that computers will fail…
—but it is cheaper to design without redundancy or resiliency.
Despite the new found attention to cyber security, 
our systems seem to be growing more vulnerable every year.
60
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Major Themes in HCI-SEC Academic Research
UserAuthentication
• Text Passwords










Policy Specification and Interaction
Security Experts




Social Media Privacy 
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HCI-SEC Lessons and Challenges
Lessons Learned:
• Users need better information, not more information 
• To make good decisions, users require clear context 
• Plain Language Works,Even if it is less precise
• Where Possible, Reduce Decisions and Configuration Options 





• Challenge of Modelling the Adversary
• The Challenge of Social Media and Social Computing
• Teaching Challenges
63
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HCI-SEC Conclusion: The Next 10 years
More HCI-SEC Research Centers
More HCI-SEC ResearchTargets
Increased Researching on Nudges and Pusuasion
Increased Emphasis on Offensive Work
Increased demand for HCI-SEC from non-technical sectors
64
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DETECTING THREATENING 
INSIDERS WITH LIGHTWEIGHT 
MEDIA FORENSICS
Naval Postgraduate School & 
The University of Texas at San Antonio
Dr. Simson Garfinkel (NPS) & Dr. Nicole Beebe (UTSA)
8am, Wednesday November 13th, 2013
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The current approaches for finding hostile insiders 
are based on “signatures.”
Sample signature to find a problem employee:






• if the mail is from a departing insider
• and the message was sent in last 30 days
• and the recipient is not in organization’s domain
• and the total bytes summed by day is more than X,
➜ send an alert to security operator
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We propose a new approach for finding threatening 
insiders—storage profile anomalies.
Hypothesis 1: 
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Hypothesis 2: 
Some illegal activity has storage indicators:
• Contraband software (hacking tools) and data
• Large amount of:
—graphics
—PII; PHI; account numbers
—Encrypted data
• Stolen documents 
Illegal employee activity is:
• Bad for business
• Exploitation threat 
• Fraud risk
We also want to detect other kinds of illegal 
employee activity.
70
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Our plan: look for storage devices that are different 
than their peers.
We build a “storage profile” from features:
• # of credit card numbers, phone #s; SSNs, DOBs, etc.
• % pictures; %video




• Others in role.
71
Garfinkel, S. and Shelat, A., "Remembrance of Data Passed: A Study of Disk 
Sanitization Practices," IEEE Security & Privacy, January/February 2003.
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Our approach:
Collect “storage profiles” and look for outliers.
We profile storage on the hard drive/storage device:
• Allocated & “deleted” files; Unallocated space (file fragments)
Statistical profile is collected:
• Frequently, at “random” times
• Securely — by going to raw media
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We cluster the storage profiles to find “outliers.”
What’s an outlier?
• Something that’s different from its peers
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Outlier detection should have significant benefits:
• Not signature based
• Not reliant on access patterns 
• Not reliant on policy definition, discovery, auditing
Design constraints:
• Agent must be scalable and cannot interfer with operations
—Desktop: background process, samples disk data
—Network load: small, aggregated data transfer
—Management console: scalable algorithms used
• Must work with isolated systems
• Must be OS agnostic
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Our system has three parts:
1. Sample disk to collect desired data 
• bulk_extractor
— a lightweight media forensics tool 
2. Client-server, enterprise response framework
• Google Rapid Response (GRR)
3. Anomaly detection agent
• Univariate and multivariate outlier detection
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11/9/2013 grr - GRR Rapid Response is an Incident Response Framework - Google Project Hosting
https://code.google.com/p/grr/ 1/2
Project  Home Wiki Issues Source
simsong@gmail.com  ▼  |  My  favorites  ▼  |  Profile  |  Sign  out
grr
GRR  Rapid  Response  is  an  Incident  Response  Framework    Search  projects
Summary      People
Project  Information


























Admin  Manual  -­  Setup  and  Configuraiton
Developers  Information
Downloads




GRR  is  an  Incident  Response  Framework  focused  on  Remote  Live  Forensics.
State  of  the  Project
GRR  is  currently  in  an  Beta  release,  ready  for  testing  by  end  users.  More
information  can  be  found  in  the  GRR  Rapid  Response  documentation.
Update:  November  2  2013  Test  release  for  0.2-­9  is  out!  You  can  get  it  by
download  the  install  script  as  per  Testing  Release
Update:  August  28  2013:  GRR  v  0.2-­8  is  out!  Grab  it  by  redownloading  the
install  script,  as  described  in  GettingStarted.
Known  issue:  This  release  comes  with  a  prebuilt  mac  client  which  does  not
support  custom  client  names,  it  will  always  run  as  "grr"  regardless  of  your
Client.name  settings.
Information
GRR  consists  of  an  agent  that  can  deployed  to  a  target  system,  and  a  server
infrastructure  that  can  manage  and  talk  to  the  agent.  More  information  can  be
found  in  the  GRR  Developer  documentation.
Client  Features:
Cross-­platform  support  for  Linux,  Mac  OS  X  and  Windows  clients  (agents)
Open  source  memory  drivers  for  Linux,  Mac  OS  X  and  Windows
Supports  searching,  downloading
Volatility  integration  for  memory  analysis
Secure  communication  infrastructure  designed  for  Internet  deployment
Client  automatic  update  support
Server  Features:
Fully  fledged  response  capabilities  handling  most  incident  response  and
forensics  tasks
OS-­level  and  raw  access  file  system  access,  using  the  SleuthKit  (TSK)
Ajax  Web  UI
Fully  scriptable  IPython  console  access
Enterprise  hunting  support
Basic  system  timelining  features
Basic  reporting  infrastructure
Support  for  asynchronous  flows
Fully  scaleable  back-­end  to  handle  very  large  deployments
Detailed  monitoring  of  client  CPU,  memory,  IO  usage
Automated  scheduling  for  reoccurring  tasks
See  GettingStarted  to  start  using  it.
Garfinkel, Simson, Digital media triage with bulk data analysis and 
bulk_extractor. Computers and Security 32: 56-72 (2013)
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Random sampling is a great way to analyze data.
Simple random sampling can determine % free space
Data characterization can determine the kind of stored data
Sector hashing can identify specific target files
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Audio Data reported by iTunes: 2.25 GiB 2.42 GB
MP3 files reported by file system: 2.39 GB
Estimated MP3 usage with random sampling : 2.49 GB 10,000 random samples
2.71 GB 5,000 random samples
Figure 1: Usage of a 160GB iPod reported by iTunes 8.2.1 (6) (top), as reported by the file system (bottom center), and
as computing with random sampling (bottom right). Note that iTunes usage actually in GiB, even though the program
displays the “GB” label.
length offset. If a frame is recognized from byte pat-
terns and the next frame is found at the specified off-
set, then there is a high probability that the fragment
contains an excerpt of the media type in question.
Field validation Once headers or frames are recognized,
they can be validated by “sanity checking” the fields
that they contain.
n-gram analysis As some n-grams are more common
than others, discriminators can base their results
upon a statistical analysis of n-grams in the fragment.
Other statistical tests Tests for entropy and other statis-
tical properties can be employed.
Context recognition Finally, if a fragment cannot be
readily discriminated, it is reasonable to analyze the
adjacent fragments. This approach works for frag-
ments found on a hard drive, as most files are stored
contiguously[15]. This approach does not work for
identifying fragments in physical memory, however,
as modern memory systems make no effort to co-
locate adjacent fragments in the computer’s physical
memory map.
4.3 Three Discriminators
In this subsection we present three discriminators that
we have created. Each of these discriminators was devel-
oped in Java and tested on the NPS govdocs1 file corpus
[16], supplemented with a collection of MP3 and other
files that were developed for this project.
To develop each of these discriminators we started
with a reading of the file format specification and a vi-
sual examination of file exemplars using a hex editor (the
EMACS hexl mode), the Unix more command, and the
Unix strings command. We used our knowledge of file
types to try to identify aspects of the specific file format
that would be indicative of the type and would be unlikely
to be present in other file types. We then wrote short test
programs to look for the features or compute the relevant
statistics for what we knew to be true positives and true
negatives. For true negatives we used files that we thought
would cause significant confusion for our discriminators.
4.3.1 Tuning the discriminators
Many of our discriminators have tunable parameters.
Our approach for tuning the discriminators was to use a
grid search. That is, we simply tried many different possi-
ble values for these parameters within a reasonable range
and selected the parameter value that worked the best. Be-
cause we knew the ground truth we were able to calcu-
late the true positive rate (TPR) and the false positive rate
(FPR) for each combination of parameter settings. The
(FPR,TPR) for the particular set of values was then plot-
ted as an (X,Y) point, producing a ROC curve[25].
4.3.2 JPEG Discriminator
To develop our JPEG discriminator we started by read-
ing the JPEG specification. We then examined a number
of JPEGs, using as our source the JPEGs from the gov-
docs1 corpus[16].
JPEG is a segment-based container file in which each
segment begins with a FF byte followed by segment
identifier. Segments can contain metadata specifying the
size of the JPEG, quantization tables, Huffman tables,
Huffman-coded image blocks, comments, EXIF data, em-
bedded comments, and other information. Because meta-
data and quantization tables are more-or-less constant and
the number of blocks is proportional to the size of the
JPEG, small JPEGs are dominated by metadata while
large JPEGs are dominated by encoded blocks.
The JPEG format uses the hex character FF to indi-
cate the start of segments. Because this character may oc-
cur naturally in Huffman-coded data, the JPEG standard
specifies that naturally occurring FFs must be “stuffed”
(quoted) by storing them as FF00.
Our JPEG discriminator uses these characteristics to
identify Huffman-coded JPEG blocks. Our intuition was
to look for blocks that had high entropy but which had
more FF00 sequences than would be expected by chance.
We developed a discriminator that would accept a block as












Garfinkel, Simson, Vassil Roussev, Alex Nelson and Douglas White, Using purpose-built functions and block 
hashes to enable small block and sub-file forensics, DFRWS 2010, Portland, OR
Young J., Foster, K., Garfinkel, S., and Fairbanks, K., 
Distinct sector hashes for target file detection, IEEE 
Computer, December 2012
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It takes 3.5 hours to read a 1TB hard drive.
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In 5 minutes you can read:
• 36 GB in one strip
• 100,000 randomly chosen 64KiB strips (assuming 3 msec/seek)
Minutes 208 5 5
Data 1 TB 36 GB 6.5 GB
# Seeks 1 1 100,000
% of data 100% 3.6% 0.65%
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The statistics of a randomly chosen sample
predict the statistics of a population.
US elections can be 
predicted by sampling 
thousands of households:
78
Hard drive contents can be predicted by 
sampling thousands of sectors:
The challenge is identifying the sector 
content that is sampled.
The challenge is identifying 
likely voters.
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We think of computers as devices with files.
79
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This heatmap of anomalies let an analyst easily 
identify clusters and outliers.
80
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Current status —
bulk_extractor updated v1.4 just released
• Added features & GRR integration preparation
Sceadan data type classifier updated v1.2 released
Extraction, transformation, loading of datesets 
• M57 Patents (digitalcorpora.org) case
Progress on anomaly detection algorithm
• Real Data Corpus extraction, translation and loading near complete
• Theoretical development
• Empirical data descriptive analyses (test assumptions)
• Univariate anomaly detection performing well on synthetic data set
81
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We are in year 1 of a 3-year effort.
82
NPS Lead UTSA Lead
Year 1 bulk_extractor upgrades
Outlier detection algorithm 
Synthetic data experimentation
Real Data Corpus experimentation
Year 2 Integrate GRR Develop/test management console
Develop/test data outlier detection
Develop/test visualization component
Year 3 Large-scale testing on partner net
Final dev. of outlier detection 
algorithm
Final dev. of visualization agent
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Many challenges remain.
“Anomalous” suggests “normal” exists
• Large, diverse, dislocated organizations
• High fluidity and variety in workforce
• Remote, mobile, multi-device access requirements
• Uninterruptible, critical computational operations
Clustering algorithm selection/development
• Accuracy and speed trade-off of extant algorithms
• Develop combinatorial algorithm to improve accuracy
• Need for automated parameter selection amidst noise
• Feature selection
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In conclusion, we are developing a system that uses 
“lightweight media forensics” to find hostile insiders.
We use random sampling to build a storage profile of media
We collect these profiles on a central server
We cluster & data mine to find outliers.
Contact:
• Simson L. Garfinkel simsong@acm.org
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